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Introduction: What is Environmental Philosophy? 
 
Scientists, economists, politicians and lawyers are not professionally qualified to address all the 
questions raised by environmental issues. Take the clearing of rainforest to provide open land for 
cattle ranching. Ecologists can explain the effects of this practice on rainforest ecosystems; 
economists, politicians and lawyers can assess its financial, political and legal ramifications. But 
various questions remain: Are we morally obliged to protect the rainforests? If so, why are we so 
obliged? Because they are more useful to us if they are left unfelled? Because they are wild (or at 
least, wilder than urban parks and botanic gardens)? Because they harbour so many endangered 
species? Because we owe it to ourselves not to permit such destruction? 
These sorts of questions cannot be answered using the methods of science or economics. They 
cannot be left to politicians and lawyers. It might seem that they could be addressed using the research 
methods of the social sciences, and it is true that one could use such methods to find out how most 
people would answer them. But empirical approaches are not enough. For although surveys and the 
like can tell us what people believe to be right or wrong, they cannot tell us what really is right or 
what really is wrong. To determine that – or at least to do so in a systematic and critical way - one 
needs philosophy. (Granted, one could object that when it comes to morality there are no absolute 
standards and that rightness and wrongness in such contexts are merely matters of opinion. But that is 
itself a philosophical claim - a statement of moral subjectivism - and in order to assess whether it is 
true one must, again, do some philosophy.) 
So the questions set out above are philosophical questions. They are the sorts of questions that 
moral philosophers – more precisely, environmental ethicists – try to answer. Yet not all the 
philosophical questions raised by environmental issues fall into the category of moral philosophy. Just 
as people’s views about morality are to some extent a function of their views about other aspects of 
the world, so reflections on the subject of environmental ethics tend to raise issues that are also of 
concern in other philosophical fields, such as aesthetics, epistemology and metaphysics. 
Environmental ethics, that is, tends to merge into the broader discipline of environmental philosophy. 
For example, it has been argued that when people think it morally permissible to use nature in any 
way they see fit, they often do so not (or not just) because they have chosen to adopt certain moral 
principles, but because they take an unjustifiably human-centred or anthropocentric view of reality. 
Consider the belief that human beings are distinguished from the rest of creation by virtue of their 
possession of souls or minds. A number of writers have argued that this dualistic belief encourages the 
notion that humans are essentially superior to the rest of creation, and that this notion, when 
supplemented by certain assumptions about the permissibility of lording it over ‘lower-order’ entities, 
encourages the conclusion that humans are morally entitled to use nature in any way they see fit (see, 
e.g., Warren 1990). If these writers are correct – and we will assess whether they are later on - then 
dualism, a thesis about reality, tends to encourage a peculiarly anthropocentric conception of 
morality. 
Assessing the plausibility of dualism and other philosophical theses frequently requires one to 
consider the results of science. But one cannot rely on science alone. The claim that minds are 
essentially nonphysical, for example, can be neither proved nor disproved by the methods of science. 
The same may be said of the proposition that biological species are not real entities but merely 
artefacts of the classificatory conventions of biologists. Such claims are to some extent philosophical 
rather than scientific. So whether or not those who wish to investigate them will need to consider the 
results of scientific inquiries, they will certainly need to engage with philosophy. 
 
Nature 
 
Although environmental issues raise questions that are best addressed using philosophical approaches, 
‘environmental philosophy’ is an unsatisfactory term in at least three respects. First, much of the 
research in the discipline focuses not on environments so much as their constituents. For instance, 
discussions of our moral duties to nonhuman animals are typically grouped under the heading 
‘environmental philosophy’. Yet it is often thought that if we have any duties to nonhuman animals, 
then this will be because the animals in question have certain morally-relevant properties in 
themselves, independently of their environments. Thus Peter Singer - a prominent Australian moral 
philosopher of whom we will hear more below - would argue that we have moral duties to giant 
pandas not because of the roles they play in the environments they inhabit, but simply because 
individual pandas have interests (notably, an interest in not suffering) that we are morally obliged to 
consider when our actions are likely to affect pandas. 
 Second, the term ‘environmental’ can encourage the notion that the nonhuman world is 
merely the backdrop for the main show – the drama of human life. However, as writers such as 
Patrick Curry (2011: 7-8) have argued, that peculiarly anthropocentric picture of reality is hard to 
square with some sorts of moral concern for the nonhuman – or, if you like, more-than-human - 
world. How, for example, could one value forests, mountains and rivers for what they are in 
themselves, if one sees them as nothing more than context? 
A third problem with the phrase ‘environmental philosophy’ is that ‘environmental’ is too 
general and vague a word to convey what the discipline is about. To what environments is it meant to 
refer? In one sense, each and every organism – from wombats to hookworms - has an environment, a 
milieu within which it operates. It may be replied that environmental philosophers tend to focus their 
attention on the sorts of environments with which we human beings tend to be familiar – woods, 
wetlands and rocky shores, rather than hydrothermal vents, say, or the insides of mammalian 
intestines. Yet even talk of human environments remains vague. To indicate just one problem: as I 
write, my environment includes a sofa, a television set and a bookcase filled with books, maps and 
DVDs. But of course environmental philosophers are not primarily concerned with such mass-
produced artefacts. Their main concern is with nature or the natural world (terms I shall use 
interchangeably). 
‘Nature’, in this context, does not denote everything that falls outside the realm of the 
supernatural (if any such realm exists). It is true that environmental philosophers do not focus their 
attention on supernatural entities such as angels and demons, yet in this respect they are no different 
from the practitioners of most other academic disciplines. To say that they are primarily concerned 
with nature is, rather, to say that their main interest is in those parts of the world whose current states 
are not, for the most part, the intended products of human actions. Flicking through a journal 
dedicated to environmental philosophy, one would not be surprised to find papers devoted to the 
topics of wilderness preservation, the aesthetic qualities of wetlands or our moral relations with 
biological species. But discussions of, say, multi-story car-parks and combustion engines will be less 
numerous.
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So environmental philosophy tends to be about nature, where nature may be conceived – 
albeit roughly and provisionally - as the nonhuman part of the biosphere. This, however, should not be 
taken to mean that something only counts as natural if it has been entirely unaffected by human 
beings. This is just as well, since entities, places, processes and events that meet this criterion will be 
difficult – if Bill McKibben (1990) is correct, impossible – to find. In view of this, I will, like many 
environmental philosophers, adopt a broad conception of what is natural in this book, one that 
includes some parts of the biosphere that have been extensively shaped by human beings. So although 
nature, on my account, will not include car-parks and combustion engines, it will include reservoirs, 
hedgerows and heaths. 
We will return to the question of what nature is in later chapters. In Chapter 7, in particular, 
we will consider some objections to the proposal that what is natural can be contrasted with what is 
human. But I will not say more about these matters here. If we refuse to move on until we come up 
with a watertight definition of what nature is, we’ll never get round to considering all the other 
interesting issues that fall under the heading of environmental philosophy. 
 
                                                     
1
 In recent years, an increasing number of moral philosophers have turned their attention to our moral relations 
with built environments (see, e.g., Fox 2006). Nonetheless, such inquiries have not traditionally been conducted 
by environmental ethicists, most of whom have shown more interest in our moral relations with what I have 
referred to as nature. 
